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What does Huawei mean for national security?

The UK’s move to give Huawei a lim­it­ed role in build­ing its 5G net­work was a land­mark deci­sion and one that con­tin­ues to divide MPs and the British pub­lic. But could it be a deci­sion Boris John­son and the coun­try will come to regret? Can our secu­ri­ty be guar­an­teed by only let­ting Huawei build the UK’s periph­ery 5G net­work?

With the CIA open­ly accus­ing Huawei of receiv­ing funds from Chi­nese state intel­li­gence, many politi­cians are wor­ried. Con­ser­v­a­tive MP and chair of the House of Com­mons For­eign Affairs Com­mit­tee Tom Tugend­hat com­pared the deci­sion to “nest­ing a drag­on”.

On top of this, the Trump admin­is­tra­tion has imposed a total ban on Huawei State­side, while warn­ing its Five Eyes allies, an Eng­lish-speak­ing intel­li­gence alliance com­pris­ing Aus­tralia, Cana­da, New Zealand, UK and the Unit­ed States, that access to intel­li­gence might be restrict­ed should they not fol­low America’s exam­ple. Aus­tralia did, but the UK decid­ed to choose its own path.

Accord­ing to Emi­ly Tay­lor, a 5G expert, remov­ing Huawei from the core of the net­work might not be enough to guar­an­tee our secu­ri­ty. As 5G is a more inte­grat­ed and intel­li­gent net­work than either 3G or 4G, what real­ly counts is the qual­i­ty of the soft­ware and the cyber­se­cu­ri­ty prac­tices adopt­ed by the provider, she explains.

“As far as Huawei is con­cerned, we know from the Huawei Cyber Secu­ri­ty Eval­u­a­tion Cen­tre 2019 Annu­al Report that there are ‘seri­ous and sys­tem­at­ic defects in its soft­ware engi­neer­ing and cyber­se­cu­ri­ty com­pe­tence’. Bugs in soft­ware make any sys­tem vul­ner­a­ble to attack,” says Tay­lor.

A spokesper­son for Huawei acknowl­edged that the 2019 Over­sight Board report detailed some con­cerns about its soft­ware engi­neer­ing capa­bil­i­ty, adding it takes such con­cerns seri­ous­ly and is invest­ing more than $2 bil­lion “to fur­ther enhance those capa­bil­i­ties”.

Security issues extend beyond Huawei and 5G

But Tay­lor, who also heads up Oxford Infor­ma­tion Labs, says the issue extends beyond Huawei. She says: “First­ly, in terms of com­peti­tors, it’s worth remem­ber­ing that Huawei open­ly shows its code to GCHQ [UK gov­ern­ment intel­li­gence and secu­ri­ty organ­i­sa­tion]. Oth­ers do not. As there isn’t sim­i­lar trans­paren­cy regard­ing the soft­ware and hard­ware of Huawei’s com­peti­tors, it’s impos­si­ble to know the over­all rate of defects in their com­put­er sys­tems.

“Sec­ond­ly, with 5G the pri­ma­ry dri­ver behind the inter­net of things, we’re going to see mil­lions of poor­ly secured devices con­nect­ing to mobile net­works. The 5G envi­ron­ment will offer mul­ti­ple oppor­tu­ni­ties for bad actors, includ­ing states, to cause harm, with­out nec­es­sar­i­ly hav­ing built the net­work.”

Ban­ning Huawei and oth­ers because they pose a threat to your own tech com­pa­nies is not the answer

But Huawei dis­agrees. The com­pa­ny points to a recent Nation­al Cyber Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil (NCSC) blog post which states that UK tele­coms net­works “are secure, regard­less of the ven­dors used”. How­ev­er, a spokesper­son adds: “The NCSC has said there’s no 100 per cent secure sys­tem, but is con­fi­dent it can man­age these risks.”

Try telling that to the Trump admin­is­tra­tion. Whether the UK’s deci­sion to give Huawei a lim­it­ed role in its 5G net­works will impact on transat­lantic secu­ri­ty co-oper­a­tion in the future is unclear. MI5 direc­tor gen­er­al Sir Andrew Park­er says it won’t, but Tay­lor is not so sure.

“What if it isn’t sabre-rat­tling? Can intel­li­gence ser­vices in democ­ra­cies real­ly choose to ignore the explic­it direc­tion of their polit­i­cal mas­ters? That’s what the US admin­is­tra­tion can­not square and it may do great harm to the Five Eyes part­ner­ship,” she says.

To min­imise this risk and open up 5G com­pe­ti­tion, Tay­lor is in favour of a mul­ti-ven­dor approach. This is a view also shared by Huawei, which says “a diverse-ven­dor mar­ket is key to secure net­works”.

How­ev­er, there’s the rub. Tay­lor says that while Huawei’s clos­est rivals, Nokia, Eric­s­son, Sam­sung and Qual­comm, have the required knowl­edge to add val­ue, they’re more expen­sive than Huawei.

“This isn’t an issue for Huawei, and oth­ers, but it’s a prob­lem for states and mobile oper­a­tors that would like to see more com­pe­ti­tion in 5G mar­kets. Indeed, it’s a lack of healthy com­pe­ti­tion that’s stymy­ing progress both in tech­nol­o­gy and in geopo­lit­i­cal cir­cles,” she says.

Tech become “a pawn” in techno-nationalism battle

It’s a predica­ment that Pro­fes­sor Paul Evans, at Canada’s Uni­ver­si­ty of British Colum­bia School of Pub­lic Pol­i­cy and Glob­al Affairs, recog­nis­es only too well. He says the Huawei spat tran­scends tech­nol­o­gy and has more to do with the US-Chi­na trade war. He believes the UK, Cana­da and oth­ers “are not only being dragged into the trade war, but are being asked to pick sides”.

“We’re see­ing two of the world’s super­pow­ers reject­ing glob­al­i­sa­tion in favour of tech­no-nation­al­ism. From the US per­spec­tive, tech­no-nation­al­ism is about pro­tect­ing America’s dom­i­nance in ICT fields and secu­ri­tis­ing the issue, even if that means ban­ning com­pa­nies like Huawei from the US mar­ket,” says Evans.

He is wor­ried for the future and thinks Amer­i­ca is on the wrong path. “Ban­ning Huawei and oth­ers because they pose a threat to your own tech com­pa­nies is not the answer,” says Evans. “It will only serve to reduce US com­pet­i­tive­ness and will restrict US pen­e­tra­tion in glob­al mar­kets. Indeed, if this were a bat­tle for hearts and minds, it’s a fight the US is los­ing.”

Will America lose its FAANGs?

The big ques­tion, of course, is what effect tech­no-nation­al­ism will have on America’s tech titans and con­sumers who use them? Tay­lor, from Oxford Infor­ma­tion Labs, has one prin­ci­pal wor­ry.

“I don’t think the FAANGs [Face­book, Ama­zon, Apple, Net­flix and Google] will be affect­ed,” she says. “It’s more that there could be splits at quite deep lev­els of the infra­struc­ture which will result in users in the East and West hav­ing a dif­fer­ent inter­net expe­ri­ence. To some extent, we’re already see­ing this being played out in the world of inter­na­tion­al tech­ni­cal stan­dards,” she says.

“Chi­na is play­ing a patient strate­gic game in tech­ni­cal stan­dards organ­i­sa­tions, where­as some in the West have been asleep at the switch. That’s per­haps the biggest take­away.”